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Abstract Researchers have to operate in an increasingly competitive envi-
ronment in which funding is becoming a scarce resource. Funding agencies are
unable to experiment with their allocation policies since even small changes
can have dramatic effects on academia. We present a Proposal-Evaluation-
Grant System (PEGS) which allows us to simulate different research funding
allocation policies. We implemented four Resource Allocation Strategies (RAS)
entitled Communism, Lottery, Realistic, and Ideal. The results show that there
is a strong effect of the RAS on the careers of the researchers. In addition the
PEGS investigated the influence of the paper writing skill and the grant review
errors.
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1 Introduction
Researchers are confronted with an environment of decreasing resources. Their
competition for funding, publications, people, infra-structure, and promotions,
is increasing steadily. The low acceptance rates for papers published at a con-
ference or journal is even being used as indicators for their exclusivity. A
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conference with a low acceptance rate for papers is being advertised as a lead-
ing conference. Highly competitive grants are considered more prestigious than
less competitive.
The National Institute of Health (NIH) had an acceptance rate in 2012,
depending on the type of funding, of either 19.3%, 16.8%, or 16.3%, (National
Institute of Healt, 2013). In other words, more than 80% of the proposals
written for NIH are being rejected. The Engineering and Physical Sciences
Research Council reported and acceptance rate within the financial year 2012-
2013 of 34% (Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council, 2013). The
Royal Society of New Zealand revealed that their Marsden Fund had an ac-
ceptance rate of only 8% in the 2014 round.
England’s Economic & Social Research Council (ESRC) has faced an in-
crease of applications of 33% between the years 2006 to 2010 (Economic and
Council, 2010). This shows that the researchers are very actively seeking fund-
ing. ESRC funding, however, remained constant, which means that within the
same time period the success rates of grants have declined from 26% to 12%.
The Large Grants Scheme of the Australian Research Council (ARC) is gen-
erally regarded as a most prestigious source of research funding for Australian
academics. Their success rates for grants hovers around only 22 per cent (Baze-
ley, 2003).
Geard and Noble (2010) developed a simulation for resource funding allo-
cation. Their agent based competitive bidding system simulated four strategy
variants. The results show that approximately three quarters of funding pro-
posals are turned down. These numbers give rise to the concern about the time
and effort spend on writing funding proposals. This does not only include the
time of the applicant, but also the time for administrators to process the ap-
plications and the examiners to review the proposals.
One ironic consequence of this practice is that researchers have little to
no time for actually doing research. In 2012, Australian researchers spent an
estimate 550 years preparing 3727 proposals, of which only 21% were funded
(National Health and Medical Research Council of Australia, 2013; Herbert
et al, 2013). This does not even include time spent in administration or re-
viewing the proposals. This effort spent is equivalent to around 66 million
Australian dollars. The total amount of funding actually allocated was 459.2
million dollars. To maintain the appearance that the process is efficient and
effective it is necessary that the 66 million dollars remain invisible. They do
not appear in any of the books of the funding agencies or the ministries. The
motivation for funding agencies to make the funding allocation process more
efficient and effective would probably be greatly improved if the costs for the
writing of the proposals would also be charged to them. The justification often
given for using such a wasteful process is that by allocating more money to
the better researchers better results could be obtained. In case that a proposal
gets funded it can also be used for the management of the project and possi-
ble publications. Some of the effort that went into the proposal writing can to
some extend be recovered.
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Frequent rejects are not limited to funding proposals. Researchers fre-
quently have their papers rejected from journals and conferences. Only very
few are able to maintain a consistently high publication records over longer
periods of time (Ioannidis et al, 2014). In part this could be due to the lack of
the papers’ quality, but it has also been pointed out that the review process
in itself is faulty and that (almost) every paper that is written gets published
eventually Bartneck (2010).
The career paths for academics are also increasingly scarce. The propor-
tion of tenured staff in the USA has decreased from around 50% in the mid
1970s (Roey and Rak, 1998) to 21% in 2010 (Knapp et al, 2011). The dra-
matic increase in fixed term academics (Jones, 2013) influences this proportion.
Similar behavior can be seen all over OECD-countries and Afonso (2013) con-
cluded that “academia resembles a drug gang”. Funken et al (2014) pointed
out that conducted an extensive survey on the situation of young academics in
Germany and came to the conclusion that “No matter if professor, junior pro-
fessor or research assistant, they all agreed that the intensive competition in
the uni-directional German academic system has lead to an unbearable level of
career uncertainty . . . In short, the increased competition is ruining the attrac-
tiveness of the Germany as an academic location.” Friesenhahn and Beaudry
(2014) came to a similar result. Their study revealed that “Many young schol-
ars shoulder extreme workloads to progress in their careers and to live up to
what is expected from them.” Their first and most important recommendation
is to increase funding for young researchers. The lack of career perspectives and
structural disadvantages (van der Lee and Ellemers, 2015) make an academic
career so unattractive that many women decide not even to try (Rice, 2014).
Tertiary Education Unions around the world are deeply concerned about the
situation for academics and the Templin Manifesto is a call for change (GEW,
German Education Union, 2014). The constant exposure to rejections from
funding agencies and publishers also has a negative effect that should not be
underestimated (Day, 2011). Researchers who’s work has been frequently re-
jected might stop research work altogether. The Performance Based Research
Fund (PBRF) in New Zealand even has a category for such academics: “R”
for “research inactive”. Carayol and Mireille (2004) showed that such passive
researchers significantly decrease the productivity of research labs.
This competition has reached a level at which considerable negative side
effects start to emerge (Bartneck, 2010). Not only do the members of academia
suffer from enormous stress (Herbert et al, 2014), job insecurity and lack of
career perspectives, the funding system as it operates right now might not
be the most efficient. In light of considerable costs of a competitive funding
allocation Barnett et al (2013) suggested that it would be better to use a simple
formula to distribute research funding. While one may or may not agree to this
specific formula it still makes clear that there are alternatives to how resources
are being allocated. We are not locked in to how the allocation is typically done
right now. A reason for why change is coming slower than one would hope for is
that even a small adjustment can have dramatic consequences for universities,
and the careers of their researchers. The implementation of the changes can
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also take considerable resources. It would therefore be utmost desirable to be
able to test different funding allocation strategies before implementing them.
In this study we will try to offer a simulation, called the Proposal-Evaluation-
Grant System (PEGS). PEGS allows us to study what consequences different
allocation strategies might have on the output of the research conducted and
how sensitive these consequences are possible bias or inaccuracy in the selec-
tion. One of our goals has been to base our simulation on as much empirical
data as possible. Furthermore, PEGS does consider psychological effects, such
as the motivation of a researcher to write applications and publications.
1.1 Research question
Our main research question is what consequences different allocation strategies
might have on the scientific output and the careers of the researchers. More
specifically, there are several research allocation strategies (RAS) that deserve
our attention. We gave each of them a name that exaggerates its nature:
– “Communism”, where every researcher gets equally resources every year
without having to apply. The advantage of this scenario is that no time is
wasted on writing, managing and reviewing proposals. A potential disad-
vantage would be that the grants given might be small.
– “Lottery”, where resources are distributed randomly between researchers.
This scenario also does not create any overheads but larger grants can be
given to a lucky few.
– “Capitalism”, where only the most capable researchers are intended to re-
ceive resources. This scenario resembles the status quo. It creates overhead
but there is a tacit assumption that more resources can be given to the
better researchers. We are interested to see to what extent the benefits
of better allocation of grants outweight the overhead or tolerate errors in
evaluation.
– “Idealism”, where no resources are wasted and no errors are made in allo-
cating the funding to the most productive scientists.
In addition we are also interested in what psychological effect the fund-
ing distribution process has on the researchers. Is the funding game a self
reinforcing cycle in which a few lucky researchers receive resources to become
productive while most researchers become frustrated and stop researching?
2 Description of PEGS
PEGS is an agent simulation system that models individual researchers in their
activities related to getting funding, aiming for promotions and making science.
In addition we consider their interaction with the research organisation and
its HR policy, the grant provider with its resource allocation scheme (RAS)
and the scientific community that gives the ultimate valuation of the scientific
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output. In our context the main output of the simulation model is the “value”
of the scientific output and the main input variable is the selected RAS. For
the operation of the model we need submodels for researchers’ mental states
and organisation’s personnel policy.
PEGS is a tool that allows policy makers and researchers to simulate simple
peer review processes of funding agencies. The resource allocation procedure
consists of researcher investing resources to writing application, funding or-
ganisation putting resources to evaluation and eventually allocating resources
to the researchers. The simulated agencies have no memory about previous ac-
tions, meaning the model is static and there is no interaction besides receiving
the current application and giving out the grants between the funding agency
and the researchers. The real world is more complex, with social connections
between the agency and researchers. Funding agencies might also consider the
track record of a researcher to decide if he or she should receive another grant.
Some grants even explicitly look at the track of a researcher, such as the NCI
Outstanding Investigator Award (R35) award. To keep PEGS manageable we
did not consider such effects, although PEGS can be extended in the future
to accommodate such consideration.
PEGS models also the scientific output. Possibly the best base for assess-
ing the scientific output is the publications that the researchers produce. At
least 13 different bibliometric indicators exists to measure the productivity of
researchers (Franceschet, 2009). For simplicity only the number of papers and
citations is captured since it combines the the quantity and quality of the pub-
lications. In other words, the total number of papers and citations received are
the parameter to be evaluated as a function of several factors. We acknowledge
that the production of papers and the number of citations they attract differ
considerably between different scientific disciplines but these differences will
need to be tackled in a future version of PEGS.
In the following paragraphs we will introduce the various factors that PEGS
is build upon. We realise that while PEGS is more complex than previous
simulations, it will still be an abstraction of reality. Such abstractions are
necessary since it is often not possible to attain empirical data upon which
certain factors could be setup. Nevertheless, we hope to be able to show that
PEGS is still able to provide valuable insights and that our abstractions are
useful.
2.1 Time usage of researchers
Researchers have different kind of tasks within the organisation. Typically the
responsibilities are divided into teaching, research and administration.
Link et al (2008) provided a detailed analysis of how academics spend their
time. Table 1 summarises their results. The column “Service” refers to activities
such as administering/reviewing grants, advising students, paid consulting and
all levels of service. The “Grants” column refers to the time used on writing the
grant proposals. The assumption is made that 30% of the professor’s service
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Mean fraction of time Total Teaching Research Grants Services
Full professor 100% 30.00% 35.15% 7.30% 27.55%
Associate professor 100% 36.40% 32.90% 7.60% 23.10%
Assistant professor 100% 31.50% 40.10% 11.60% 16.80%
Post-doc 100% 10.00% 60.00% 20.00% 10.00%
Table 1 Average time allocation of researchers based on (Link et al, 2008)
time is used for administering grants. Post-docs would naturally not supervise
grant writing, since there is no researcher at a lower position. Based on table
1 we conclude that academics at their different career levels use on average,
42.04% of their time for research. If they would spend no time on writing
grants then this would be increased by another 19.75%. This percentage is the
average grant writing time plus 30% of their service time. This means that
if academics would not need to spend any time on writing grants then they
would have on average 65.1% of their time available for research, assuming
that they would have 3.31% administrative costs.
2.2 Grant system costs
To make the system time usage more accurate, there is also an administrative
cost from having the grant proposal handling process. Administrative staff is
hired for handling the funding proposals and otherwise these resources that are
allocated for administrative staff, could be also used to research. The basic idea
is that the amount of resources (time) that are allocated for administration
is also lowered when the time for grant writing is lowered and when resources
assigned to grant process is zero percent, also this administrative cost can be
fully assigned for research.
To determine how much higher it should be as a reference, New ZealandâĂŹs
research quality evaluation system is used as an example (Tertiary Education
Comission, 2012). Under the review system there are 6 757 researchers. The
average hourly cost of researcher is $51 and yearly hours per one researcher
are 1950. The PBRF runs every 6 years with a total cost of $50,750,200. So,
the cost for each researcher is $1,251.80, or $24.5 per hour.
From here it can be seen that there is 3.31% overhead of the resources
that would otherwise go to research. This means that researchers would have
3.31% more resources in use without PBRF which would go straight to research
without application process. This includes also the time spent on reviewing the
proposals. In England, similar system, called RAE, where administrative cost
of this is 0.8% (Koelman and Venniker, 2011). This overhead is corresponding
to research time; the less grant time, the less overhead. Eventually it can be
assumed that when there is no grant system, all the overhead resources can
be assigned for research time. Grants that are available through private sector
are not in the focus of our simulation since their resource allocation process is
often not documented.
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2.3 Careers
PEGS includes a simulated academic career system. This is an important fac-
tor for the motivation of researchers and it can also influence how much time
they can spend on research. The amount of time spend on teaching and admin-
istration varies amongst the different career levels. Education has a negative
effect on research productivity. The more time researches spend on education,
the less productive they are (Hattie and Marsh, 1996). We therefore need to
define the different career levels and how they spend their time. In Australia,
unlike the United States, but similar to Britain and New Zealand, the academic
hierarchy had the following distribution (Moses, 1986):
– 9.3% of university teaching and research staff were professors,
– 12.3% were associate professors/readers,
– 32.1% were senior lecturers,
– 22.5% were lecturers,
– 6.0% were principal tutors, senior tutors/demonstrators.
The remaining 17.8% were tutors/demonstrators on contract who can-
not compete in the promotion stakes. At the University of Canterbury, New
Zealand, the distribution was in 2013 as follows (Canterbury University - Hu-
man Resource Department, 2013):
– 22% were full professors,
– 43% were senior lecturers,
– 17% were lecturers and
– 17% were post-docs
The feature that both sources have in common is that the shape of the
organisation is like Grecian urn, where senior lecturers are the largest group.
There is also evidence that in computer science field the number of post-docs
has increased dramatically in the past few years (Jones, 2013). The assumption
is that those positions prosper well where the grants are directed.
Only 7 out of 174 successful ARC applicants did have a principal investi-
gator that did not at least have a Ph.D. degree. It is therefore fair to assume
in PEGS that only research with a Ph.D. qualification or greater is examined.
PEGS does not consider Ph.D. students as staff members and hence they
are excluded from the career simulation although their contributions are vis-
ible through the increased output of researchers that received funding. Often
funding is being used to finance Ph.D. students who then execute the proposed
project. This leaves our simulated PEGS instance with four different academic
positions: Post-doc, assistant professor, associate professor and full professor.
In order to get promoted, academics need to fulfil certain criteria before
they are eligible for a higher position. Researchers are eligible to apply for pro-
motion after a certain amount of years and a proven track record. Curtis and
Thornton (2013) reported that in the 1990âĂŹs, a Ph.D. degree was on aver-
age obtained at the age of 31 and the first professorship was typically achieved
at the age of 43.9. Moreover, he reported that fixed-term positions increased
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after the year 2000 and are now reaching over 40% of academic positions.
Full-time permanent positions have decreased at a similar rate, plateauing to
around 17%. A further distinction can be made between academics that are on
a fixed term contract but who either have the option to receive a permanent
contract in the future (tenure track) and those who will not have that option
(non-tenure-track). Tenure-track positions have decreased to approximately
15%, while non-tenure-track positions have been plateauing around 15% for
years.
The career level of a researchers has a strong influence on how they divide
up their time on the main academic activities of research, eduction, services
and grant writing. The differences in time allocations between researchers are
shown in table 1.
At times researchers may also decide to leave academia. The factors that
contribute to such a decision are salary, integration, communication and cen-
tralisation (Johnsrud and Rosser, 2002). Their study showed that career oppor-
tunities within academia also affects job satisfaction, morale and commitment.
Furthermore they found that neither gender nor ethnicity does significantly
influence changes in morale. Barnes et al (1998) presented similar factors as
mentioned above, but distills them to two main predictors; frustration due to
time commitments and lack of a sense of community. Especially researchers
who have not gained a permanent position are likely to leave research organisa-
tion, if they have received offers elsewhere. In this case a single interview of an
anonymous frustrated colleague was used as a guideline (who mentioned that
a researcher would wait seven years for a tenure until leaving an organisation).
PEGS condensates the factors even further by focusing on frustration which
is dependent on two main predictors, level of research funding and recognition
gained through promotions. Even academic careers come to an end although
the retirement age varies considerably between countries and professors. Some
continue working well beyond the point when they are eligible for retirement.
Bazeley (2003) showed that receiving a grant is dependent on the university
that researcher is representing, as well as it is dependent on the academic’s
status; having a research-only position had a strong positive correlation with
the success in winning funding. Research fellows and readers are more likely to
be successful on average than teaching and research academics at an equivalent
level (Bazeley, 2003). The average retirement age is set to 67, and it is expected
for researchers to gain their Ph. D. at age of 30, on average.
2.4 Motivation
There have been various studies which tried to identify the factors that influ-
ence the researchers’ productivity. Kelchtermans and Veugelers (2005) pointed
out that these factors include gender, age, education, rank of the university, tal-
ent, luck, effort, tenure, rank, and seniority in rank. We speculate that further
factors such as courage, intelligence, writing skill, charisma, social contacts
and determination may play a role. Moses (1986) investigated the relationship
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between rewarding academic staff and their motivation. The results show that
MaslowâĂŹs hierarchy of needs also seems to apply to academia. First of all
safety, meaning having a permanent position, increases motivation. But also
the sense of achievement, such as recognition for teaching, promotions, super-
vision of students, published papers and successful grant applications increase
motivation. But the opposite is true as well. Lack of these recognitions is caus-
ing demotivation (Day, 2011). Grit does also seem to have a major effect on
academic success (Duckworth et al, 2007).
Motivation is also associated with the intention of researchers to leave
academia. Barnes et al (1998) showed a model in which the intent to leave
academia dependent on four predictor variables (stressors): the reward and
recognition, time commitment, influence, and student interaction. Furthermore
it depended on two moderator variables: Interest in discipline and sense of
community. They showed that there is a positive correlation between stress
and intention to leave academia. From the four stressors, time commitment
had the strongest correlation for intention to leave the academia.
2.5 Skill
The assumption is that researchers are individuals, hence not possessing the
same weaknesses and strengths, such as their research skills. Characteristics
and factors that are frequently mentioned in the literature (Barnes et al, 1998;
Link et al, 2008) are:
– personal properties (talent, skill, intelligence)
– career-centered attributes (tenure, seniority)
– effort (motivation, determination, stress)
– time (available in total, used for applying, used for research, used for teach-
ing)
Geard and Noble (2010) presented a model where they define a few at-
tributes such as research skill R which is distributed uniformly between 0 and
1. There is also the attribute G which increases the researchers’ scientific out-
put if a grant is awarded. Researchers also have an attribute called effort. If
they apply for a grant, this application time is taken away from actual research
time. A few assumptions are also made: The quality of researchers’ application
correlates with their research skills. However, researcher can compensate lower
research skill with using more time for applications, and for this there is a di-
minishing returns on time invested. Also, the funding decision is not accurate,
hence there is a noise factor allocated. For PEGS, a similar method for skill
allocation is used, but instead with a log-normal distribution that mimics the
observed distribution of the scientific impact.
Even when the applicant might be an expert on his/her field, it is not
obvious that the grant reviewers are. In other words, the grant application
needs to be composed in a manner where the idea can be sold to the person
with lesser knowledge about the subject. Hence it is not obvious that a talented
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researcher is also a talented application writer (Peyton and Bundy, 2006), a
new factor, application skill, is also introduced in PEGS.
There is a small correlation between gender and productivity. Females
tend to publish less at the beginning of their career compared to males but
this reverses later in their careers (Kelchtermans and Veugelers, 2005). van
Arensbergen et al (2012) showed that the link between gender and produc-
tivity disappeared in the younger generation. Furthermore, there seem to be
a quadratic relationship between age and number of publications. Besides the
established correlations that is likely also an element of chance. At times pa-
pers get accepted or rejected not because of their quality but possibly because
of the specific reviewers that were assigned. We therefore included a stochastic
element into our simulation.
Another important factor for the productivity of a researcher is their ca-
reer status. Researchers in higher positions typically have a higher output.
Link et al (2008) showed that despite the fact that senior researchers are
increasingly burdened with administrative tasks, they also supervise many
postgraduate students. Instead of performing the research themselves, their
students and post-docs do. The senior research maintains his authorship role
while not being directly involved in the execution of the studies. In extreme
cases this is considered trophy authorships.
Researchers also develop a skill of writing proposals and possibly even
enter a self reinforcing cycle. Researchers who received grants before are way
more likely to receive again. Only 4.1% of funded researchers did not have
any funding during the previous three years. When it comes to publications,
successful ARC applicants have been solo or first authors for more books,
articles and chapters than unsuccessful ones (Bazeley, 2003).
Among ARC, the median age for grant applicants ranged from 40 to 49
years. Younger applicants (below 40 years) who applied either by themselves
or who were the first author of the application tended to be less successful
than those who were older (Bazeley, 2003). However, grant applications with
a young researcher as second or third named investigator were at least as
successful. Male researchers receive more grants, which can be explained by the
lack of senior female researchers. Bazeley (2003) indicate that that there is no
significant difference either in age or gender on the success rate of applications.
2.6 Scientific impact
Scientific impact means how well the work has been received among its target
audience compared to others. Shortly put, how often the paper has been cited.
Wang et al (2013) presented a validated model based on empirical data that
can predict the citation patterns: How often, and when the citations occur.
For a mechanism to count citations of a single paper pj as a function of time
the following formula is presented for probability that paper i is cited at time
t after publication as






where ηi indicates fitness of the paper cti indicates received citations so far,
and Pi (t) aging as a function of time.
2.7 Discussion
From the above elaboration we identify several factors that influence the suc-
cess in grant applications and in science itself: fairness and competitiveness
of the grant allocation scheme, available time, career system, personal proper-
ties, motivation and finally the citation mechanism of the scientific community.
These can be roughly divided in grant allocation policy, organisational policy
and personality related aspects.
On grant allocation policy level the following aspects should be taken into
the model:
– Total amount of research resources (compared to the potential/desire of
the researcher population to use them).
– Distribution of resources (varying between flat (communistic) distribution
and dichotomic distribution to selected grant holders only)
– Grant selection objectivity (ranging from lottery to perfect, objective rank-
ing of applications)
– Application evaluation criteria (weighting between research and writing
merits of the application)
– The application evaluation overhead.
As our focus is in grant allocation policies we model only one discipline
in one organisation. Hence the essential mechanism on organisational level is
the promotion policy (leaving aside science policy and competition between
different organisations).
On researcher level we assume, for simplicity, that the personal properties,
such as skill to write proposals or papers, are constant in time for each in-
dividual. Moreover, we consider each researcher for her individual work only
(ignoring collaboration from the model). For motivation we build a simple
model for temporal dynamics which we assume the same for all individuals.
Thus we have to model essentially
– Variability in skills among researchers and role of skills in creation of sci-
entific impact
– Personal productivity (mechanism that explains the amount of papers for
given resources).
– Model for factors of productivity (weighting the roles of frustration and
availability of resources to productivity)
– Build up of frustration due to lack of promotion or funding.
– Applying intensity (how much effort is spent in application writing and
how it depends on the personal status)
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We will now proceed in describing the exact mathematical model that is
used for PEGS.
3 Mathematical Model
PEGS is based on several assumptions that we will now discuss. First, we con-
sider a population of researchers as a pool of decision making agents. They
have to split time to apply for funding, to make science, to teach and to provide
other services. The scientific output will be primarily papers whose quantity
depends on the time available and motivation to research. The quality/value
of publications depends on the individual research skills. The researchers also
have careers and frustration levels which are interconnected. Rejection either
in funding or promotions increases frustration. Secondly, we assume that pub-
lications are a good indicator for scientific output. Researchers might also have
other outputs, such as contributions to the community and patents, but for
simplicity we focus on publications. The simulated PEGS does not include a
sub-model for the peer-review process for publications.
Our modelling goal is to measure the influence of different grant distribu-
tion policies to a research community and its scientific impact. As different
communities are typically observed with yearly statistics we build a discrete
in-time model with a time step of one year. The main observable will be
yearly accumulated citations to the scientific output and the main input pa-
rameters to be varied are related to the allocation policy for research grants.
Other model parameters and observables are related to different structural
components and submodels of the overall system (like HR-policy, dynamics of
motivation/frustration and its influence to research productivity, distribution
of research skill and so on).
3.1 Dependency of variables
Before introducing the concrete variables and their dependencies, we intro-
duce the notation conventions. We will refer to sets with uppercase, to indi-
vidual items (set members) by lower case. The main concepts are organisation
(o), paper (p) and researcher (r). In general the functional dependencies are
stochastic. So by f we refer to a generic stochastic function. By y we refer to
an individual year.
The model contains dependencies between multiple elements. The mod-
elled process involves funding to researchers that work in an organisation and
produce publications that are valued for their scientific impact. We elaborate
the model backwards starting from the observed output.
We will elaborate separately on the variables related to the dynamics of an
individual (researcher, his/her personal state, papers and citations) and the
status of an organisation (movement of researchers in and out and between
different career levels). Finally we will consider the variables necessary for the
resource allocation as grants.
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3.2 Researcher and paper dynamics
We fix as the main output parameter of the simulation the amount of yearly






where C(p, y) contains all citations C of the paper p in the year y. This does
not include the citations of resigned/retired ex staff that is often included in
standard bibliometric comparisons. The (active) publications of the organi-
sation in year y, P o(y), is defined as follows:




where P r is the set of publications by researcher r and Ro(y) is the set of
researchers of the organisation o for the given year.Citations per researcher
are needed in career path modelling and formed as follows:




We now need to describe how the citations of the publications emerge and
how the number of publications can be calculated. Let us start with defining
how the publications attract citations. The formation of citations is a function
of the quality of paper and time since publishing, since the citations are not
formed in one instance but over the time.
C (p, y) = C (p, y − 1) + f (y − yp, q(p)) (5)
where yp is the year of publishing, and q(p) indicates the quality of publication.
The quality is formed as a function of researchers skill s:
q (p) = f (s(r)) for p ∈ P (r) (6)
The number of new publications during a year y, is a function of
time available for research τr and researchers productivity. This, of course, is
measured for year y:
card(Pr(y)) = f(θr(y), τr(y)) (7)
The productivity θ consists of two parts, resource dependent produc-
tivity (depending on funding decision) and commitment (which depends on
promotion history):
θ(y) = f (θb(y), θm(y)) . (8)
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Here θb is the commitment, which is dependent on the frustration θb(y) =
f(ur, y) and θm(y) = f(mw,mr, y) is a function of expected resources mw and
received resources mr.
The decision making of the researchers is modelled with the concept of
frustration that influences the productivity of a researcher and tendency to
seek opportunities outside of academia. We assume that frustration evolves as
function of funding decisions and promotions. Frustration builds up over time
and hence is modelled incrementally as:
ur (r, y) = f (ur (r, y − 1) , a, p, r,mw,mj)) (9)
where r is researcher, a years in academia and p is position. This is dependent
also from how many resources were wanted mw and received mj for year y.
Time available for research depends from the funding τe, available for
all the researchers, funding received through grants τg and the resource used
in applying for grants τa.
τ r (r, y) = τe + τg (r, y)−τa (r, y) . (10)
Time used for applying, τa is dependent on the level of frustration ur and
from the position pr.
τa(r) = f (pr, ur, r) (11)
3.3 Organisation dynamics
To understand the differences between position ladders pr, the dynamics of
the organisation need to be opened.
First we will define how researchers join or leave academia. The set of
researchers of an organisation during year y, Ro(y) evolves as function of time
as follows:
Ro(y) = Ro(y − 1)\L(y) ∪ J(y) (12)
where L(y) is the set of researchers leaving the organisation and J(y) is the
joining researchers at year y. Researcher leaves from organisation if either the
frustration ur grows too large or the time spent in academia a grows too
high which is considered as exceeding the retirement age. More formally:
r ∈ L(y) with probability f(ur, a, y). (13)
Joining to organisation depends on the HR policy of the organisation.
On general level we assume that the amount of new staff is dependent on the
current staff volume and of the vacancies becoming free:
card(J(y)) = f(card(Ro(y − 1), card(L(y))) (14)
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That is, the amount of new recruitments depends (at least stochastically)
on the current head count after resignments.
Whether researcher gets promoted depends on the researcher related at-
tributes like citations cr, years spent in academia a, researcher’s current level l
as well as organisational attributes like positions available on next ladder and
performance of the peers at current level. This results in:
l(r, y) = f (l (r, y − 1) , a (r, y) , c (r, y − 1)) (15)
The positions that are available for given ladder do not have to be fixed.
This way the promotions can depend mainly on researcher’s personal traits,
not just from chance of opening of new positions in right time.
3.3.1 Grant allocation
The quality of applications is dependent on the researchers’ personal traits
and how much time they allocate to prepare the application.
A(r, y) = f(τa(r, y),m(r, y), s(r), w(r)) (16)
where τa is time used for applying, m is motivation, s(r) is research skill and
w(r) is applying skill.
The grant applications are reviewed with limited resources, hence the per-
ceived quality of the application at evaluation, E, depends of the actual quality
and the time available for assessment τo,
E = f(A, τo). (17)
Resources for research consist of two parts: resources distributed uni-
formly among researcher population Ro, and to resources distributed as com-
petitive grants based on the perceived quality of researchers’ applications. The
amount of grant funding τg(r) received by researcher r is dependent on qual-
ity of the application As, when it is compared to quality of other researchers
applications.
τg(r) = G(E(R); r) (18)




τg(r) = cnst (19)
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4 Simulated model instance
Now that we have described the factors of PEGS, we can describe a concrete
instance of the model to be simulated.
Since we are interested in the distribution of limited resources using differ-
ent policies we set the total amount of funding available as constant over the
years and across different simulated scenarios although the literature (Afonso,
2013; Economic and Council, 2010) indicates that the amount of resources
available for research has decreased over the years.
The main aspects that influence how the resources get allocated are re-
lated to application writing and evaluation and actual distribution of resources
amongst the researchers.
4.1 Citations
We use a formula derived from equation (1) to count citations of a single paper
pj as a function of time. The probability that paper i is cited at time t after











where Φ(x) is the density function of the normal distribution, m, β and A are
global parameters and relative fitness is presented as λi ≡ βηiA . µi indicates
immediacy, governing the time for a paper reach its citation peak and σi is
longevity, capturing the decay rate (Wang et al, 2013). t indicates time since
publication in years.
In our case the immediacy, longevity and m are set to constant values
1.0 and only the fitness will vary. Hence simplifying the equation (20) and
assuming that the citations are created by a Poisson process we get
cyi = Poisson(e
λiΦ(ln (y−yp)−1) − 1). (21)
Naturally the fitness should depend on researcher skills.
4.2 Researcher skills
The empirically observed distribution of the papers’ fitnesses by Wang et al
(2013) suggests lognormal distribution for λ. This invites us to set the fitness as
λi = srf where both the personal research skill sr and the per paper variability
f are drawn from lognormal distributions. We fix the variance of log(λ) to 0.25
and split this variance between log(sr) and log(f) with simulation parameter
cskill.
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4.3 Publications
The number of papers P a researcher publishes (see function 3) in year y is
defined by the formula:
P (y) = Poisson(τy ∗ cpubl ∗ ((1− cprod) + θy ∗ cprod)) (22)
where θ is the productivity and τ the time available for research. The calibra-
tion constant cpubl is used to adjust the yearly publication rate under fixed
productivity and cprod can be used to adjust the relative importance of moti-
vation and funding related productivity. In simulation cpubl is kept inversely
proportional to the total research resource to normalize the expected publica-
tion count to one publication per researcher per year for cprod = 0.
4.4 Productivity
As in equation (8), commitment is created with formula θb = 1 − ur, where
ur is current frustration. Resource productivity θm in its turn depends on
how much resources was expected, and how much was received. The relative
importance of commitment and resources can be adjusted in simulations by
parameter ccommit. More formally:








Frustration is dependent on resources and promotions. The formula is as fol-
lows:





For evolution of monetary frustration two mechanisms are considered. First
mechanism is monotonous build up of frustration due to limited amount of
funding. This is normalised so that with average funding level full frustration
is reached in 1/cfrus1 years. The second mechanisms reduces or increases frus-
tration in case the grant is bigger or smaller than the average for the researcher
population. That is: with mw as the (subjectively) expected resources, mr the
actually received resources and m̄ the average resource per researcher
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Here cfrus2 is a simulation parameter controlling the importance of this effect.
The mechanism is normalised to be independent of the amount of resources
available.
The promotional frustration depends on how much time researchers spend
on each position. If the expected time for promotion has passed the frustration
starts to grow:
up(y) = cl ∗max(0, t− Tl) (28)
where t is the time spent in the position, cl is the yearly increment in frustra-
tion (depends on position level l, cl = (0.2, 0.2, 0.125, 0)) and Tl is the time in
position where frustration starts to grow in position level l, Tl = (3, 3, 4,−)).
4.6 Human resource issues
The personnel status of an organisation is updated yearly as follows: first the
persons retiring or leaving due to excess frustration are removed from popula-
tion. Then, starting from the highest level of positions (professors) promotion
from the previous level is processed. Once all promotions have been executed,
new staff is taken to the first position level.
For our simulation we use four levels for positions: l = {1, 2, 3, 4}, which can
be taken as {post-doc, assistant professor, associate professor, full professor},
respectively.
The researcher leaves due to frustration if the level of frustration ur exceeds
one.
ur ≥ 1, r ∈ L(y) (29)
When researcher has spent long enough (at least 32 years) in the organisa-
tion the probability of retiring that year will be positive (0.25 in simulations
leading to expected retirement after 35 years of service).
For promotions two extreme scenarios are implemented: position structure
based and researcher performance based. In both scenarios the researchers on
level l − 1 are filtered for promotion to level l starting from the highest level.
In position structure based scenario the head counts on each level are
fixed. Hence the number of promotions is determined from resignations and
promotions on the higher level. The researchers are sorted according to citation
count within each level and the top of the list gets promoted.
In researcher performance based scenario a researcher gets promoted if she
has been working a minimum time in current level and shows good enough
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performance compared to peers on same level. That is, has at least cr(y) >
cpromc̄ citations where c̄ is the average citation count of researchers on the
same career level. Value for the threshold constant cprom is used as simulation
parameter
In both scenarios, both the promotional and monetary frustration of re-
searcher go to zero when promoted. Finally, once all promotions have been
done, new post-docs with random research and writing skills are created to
the first level to restore the organisation head count.
4.7 Quality of grant application
The quality of researchers’ grant applications depends on their research and
applying skills and motivation. Dependency model with a tunable parameter
cres will be considered:
Q = cressr + (1− cres)sa(1− ur) (30)
where sr is the research skill, sa the applying skill and ur the frustration.
The evaluated qualityQe of the application depends on the actual qualityQ
and evaluation error E. As there is no empirical data on the type of evaluation
error and its dependency on the resource spent in evaluation (overhead) we
consider a simple model with tunable error term:
Qe = (1− cerr)Q+ cerre, (31)
where e is random error with same distribution as the application quality.
4.8 Resource allocation
Resource allocation to research is made in several phases. First the nominal
total research resource level τ is fixed and productivity and frustration mecha-
nisms normalised. The total resource is divided to overhead, evenly distributed
resource and resource available for grants, τ = τo + τe + τg as dictated by the
simulated scenario.
For Communism τ = τe, for Lottery and Ideal scenarios τ = τg.
In Capitalism (a.k.a. Realistic) scenarios the resource used for application
writing is computed as a fraction of the evenly distributed resource (to enable
all researchers to allocate time in application writing). The time spent in
application writing is proportional to motivation, τa = cwriteτe(1−ur), where
cwrite is a simulation parameter.
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5 Simulation
5.1 Simulation setup
The simulation was set up to study the equilibrium behaviour of the academic
community under fixed grant allocation policy. Hence only one organisation
was implemented to model the whole community. After preliminary tests it was
found that population size of 100 researcher or bigger is needed to eliminate
the artifacts due to population size. Hence the nominal population size of
100 was chosen for experimentation. A warm up time of 100 years was found
sufficient to eliminate the effects of initial values. Simulations were performed
as one long run of the model taking independent samples at regular intervals.
The simulations are reported as averages over 10 replications of 200 years of
simulation for each combination of parameters with 50 years without recording
between the samples to maintain statistical independence of the observations.
5.2 Comparison of grant allocation policies
A set of experiments with rather diverse allocation scenarios was made to
compare different grant allocation policies. We considered pure communism
(all resources distributed evenly) and scenarios where half of the resources
were allocated evenly and the rest as grants based on either pure lottery, ideal
oracle-like selection (all resources for the most skilled researchers without any
cost of writing or evaluation) and realistic scheme with cost of application
writing and significant role for writing skills and evaluation error (equal weight
for research and writing skill in quality of application and equal weight for the
quality and random error in selection).
Four contextual parameters were varied in addition to the grant allocation
policies:
– level of resources (50% to 60% of the full capacity of the researcher popu-
lation),
– frustration build up mechanism (only monotonous build up of frustration
due to limited funding or with additional effect due to comparing to the
peer average funding level),
– variability in researchers’ skill levels (35% or 65% of the variance in pa-
pers’ fitnesses attributed to differences between researchers, the rest being
random variation in the output of an individual),
– promotion policies (personal promotion after sufficient years of service and
sufficient citation record or based on availability of free positions on next
ladder within a rigid position structure).
We monitored the citation and publication counts, as well as average skill
and frustration levels and the average yearly resignations/recruitments. These
are summarised in Table 2 and Figure 1 detailing only the effects of grant
allocation and promotion policies.
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Promotion Case Citations Papers Frustration Skill Recruitments
Individual Communism 345 82 36 113 3,8
Individual Lottery 351 84 38 113 4,4
Individual Realistic 403 80 34 120 5,1
Individual Ideal 535 89 39 126 7,3
Organizational Communism 338 81 38 115 4,3
Organizational Lottery 342 84 39 113 4,8
Organizational Realistic 398 80 34 119 5,1
Organizational Ideal 514 90 38 122 6,5
Table 2 Publication, citation and recruitment rates/100 researcher years and accumulated
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Fig. 1 Publications, citations and frustration across RAS and Promotion type
We performed an ANCOVA in which the RAS and the Promotion Policy
were the independent variables and Frustration Speed, Skill Parameter and
Level Of Resources were covariants. Citations, papers, frustration and skill
were the dependent variables. The RAS had a significant influence on Cita-
tions (F (3, 629) = 3474, 141, p < 0.001), Papers (F (3, 629) = 4600.075, p <
0.001), Frustration (F (3, 629) = 639.942, p < 0.001), and Skill (F (3, 629) =
1179.250, p < 0.001). Post-hoc t-tests with Bonferroni corrected alpha showed
that that all four RAS were significantly different for almost all dependent
variables with the exception of the ideal and lottery RAS were not signifi-
cantly different on Frustration and the RAS lottery and communism were not
different in terms of Citations.
The Promotion Policy had a significant influence on Citations (F (1, 629) =
53.044, p < 0.001), Papers (F (1, 629) = 9.344, p = 0.002), Frustration (F (1, 629) =
8.992, p = 0.003), and Skill (F (1, 629) = 31.346, p < 0.001). There was a signif-
icant interaction effect between RAS and Promotion Policy on all dependent
variables.
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Frustration Speed had a significant influence on Frustration (F(1,629)=5.923,
p=0.015), Papers (F (1, 629) = 77.074, p < 0.001), and Citations (F (1, 629) =
9.608, p = 0.002). The Skill Parameter had a significant influence on Cita-
tions (F (1, 629) = 1534.39, p < 0.001), Papers (F (1, 629) = 19.587, p <
0.001), Frustration (F (1, 629) = 24.506, p < 0.001), and Skill (F (1, 629) =
3796.045, p < 0.001). The Level of Resources had a significant influence on
Citations (F (1, 629) = 37.752, p < 0.001) and Skill (F (1, 629) = 10.059, p =
0.002). It did not affect the level of frustration and papers (indicating that
scaling of frustration mechanism and paper production mechanism worked as
expected).
The communism and lottery scenarios differ only in the way each researcher
gets the expected research funding. Communism guarantees constant low level
of funding that results to constant increase of frustration whereas lottery leads
to fluctuating funding and staircase type of evolution in frustration. This dif-
ference is enough to have an impact in the personnel dynamics and paper
productivity. Lottery creates unlucky individuals that frustrate faster and also
resign faster than in communism (resignations from level 1 are one year earlier
on average in lottery compared to communism and the level of dropouts is
over 10% units higher (18 % vs 5%)). This results in higher volume of recruit-
ments and higher proportion of level 1 staff for lottery. Lottery creates also a
subpopulation of lucky ones that get funded and hence produce more papers,
attract citations faster and get promoted earlier. This makes the frustrated un-
lucky ones overrepresented in the population and increases the population level
frustration. The chance element in lottery helps lucky less qualified individuals
to promote which slightly reduces the population skill average compared to
communism. The sum effect of all these mechanisms is that the differences
in citation counts are not significant between communism and lottery, despite
differences in other observables and population dynamics.
Compared to "blind" communism or lottery the ideal and realistic schemes
that account for research skills lead to higher average skill in population, faster
circulation of staff and to higher citation counts. The time spent in writing
leads to smaller average paper count while ideal allocation of funding improves
productivity by allocating funds mainly to motivated researchers. The differ-
ences between grant allocation policies are bigger than between quite different
promotion policies. Other factors (frustration build up, level of resources and
variability in skill levels) have also statistically significant effect to most observ-
ables but these are as a rule smaller than the effects between grant allocation
policies. In particular they do not alter qualitatively the effects shown here for
the citations. However, especially the variance in skill levels among researchers
has a clear influence to the difference in citation counts between the skill based
and random allocation scenarios.
Individual promotion policy allows, and leads to, varying personnel profiles.
As we can see from Table 3 the grant allocation schemes have significant impact
to the individual promotion and head counts on different career levels. The
impact of allocation schemes is clearly much bigger than the effect of different
skill distribution in the basic population. For fixed personnel structure (25
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persons for each level for all time) the differences were best observed in varying
promotion ages. Skill (as well as luck) based allocation of funding leads to faster
promotion.
SkillParameter Case 1 2 3 4
0,35 Communism 18,8 21,8 32,5 27,0
0,35 Lottery 21,0 22,0 31,7 25,3
0,35 Realistic 25,6 24,0 28,7 21,8
0,35 Ideal 34,3 25,1 23,9 16,6
0,65 Communism 19,8 22,6 32,1 25,4
0,65 Lottery 22,0 22,9 31,1 24,1
0,65 Realistic 26,5 24,9 28,4 20,2
0,65 Ideal 35,8 24,8 23,9 15,5
Table 3 Average head counts at different career levels (individual promotion policy)
Case Level 1 Level 2 Level 3
Communism 5,3 10,8 19,9
Lottery 4,9 10,3 19,0
Realistic 4,4 9,1 16,5
Ideal 3,6 7,2 13,1
Table 4 Average promotion years at different career levels (organizational promotion pol-
icy)
5.3 Simulation of application evaluation mechanisms
The next step in model analysis was to consider the submodels related to
application evaluation. There are essentially two independent mechanisms to
be studied - the build up of the “objective” quality of the application based
on intrinsic research skill and writing (i.e. non-research) skills and the actual
selection outcome that is a function of the objective quality and evaluation
error. It is plausible that both application quality and accuracy of evaluation
depend on the time used but as we have no model for this dependency we fix
the time budget and vary quality and accuracy parameters independently.
The “Realistic” scenario with 50% resource level, non monotonous frus-
tration build up and lower variability of researcher skills was taken as basis
(with 1/10:th of research time made available for writing and 5% reserved
for administrative overhead). Research skill’s weight in the application quality
varied from 20% to 100% and the weight of the evaluation error from 0% to
80%. The results are shown in Table 5 and Figure 2.
The effects are quite insensitive to the promotion policy. Also it is seen
that the grant allocation mechanism tolerates quite well small evaluation er-
rors and moderate role of the writing skill. However, when the writing skill
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Policy SkillWeight/ErrorWeight 0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8
Individual 0,20 325 327 328 319 301
Individual 0,40 367 367 360 335 306
Individual 0,60 407 408 389 346 308
Individual 0,80 433 423 399 357 309
Individual 1,00 436 416 393 355 316
Organizational 0,20 321 323 322 310 294
Organizational 0,40 357 355 347 328 296
Organizational 0,60 396 399 378 340 303
Organizational 0,80 423 416 387 350 307
Organizational 1,00 425 412 385 343 307
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Fig. 2 Citation counts across skill research skills and evaluation error
starts to dominate (research skill contributes at most 40%) the evaluation error
loses its role and the results correspond to the lottery at most and eventually
the performance degrades to worse than lottery due to the time sacrificed to
application writing and evaluation. Naturally the lost time affects to the per-
formance also in absence of evaluation error or bias. The ideal scenario with
full resources leads to 495+−5 citations. Thus writing and evaluation overhead
leads to 15− 20% drop in performance as expected (for selected parameters).
Given that (for these parameters) lottery can reach up to 330 citations (65% of
the ideal performance), the role of application overhead is significant as such
and is further amplified by the bias and error in the selection.
5.4 Analysis of application writing time mechanism
As last case we consider the effect of reserving research time for application
writing. The “Realistic” scenario with 50% resource level, non monotonous
frustration build up and lower variability of researcher skills was again taken
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as basis. The roles of writing skill and evaluation error were set to 50%. No
separate overhead for application evaluation was applied but evaluation was
included in the preparation workload.
Half of the total research resource was allocated to grants and the rest
distributed evenly to researchers to be available to preparing applications and
making research. 0 to 90% of that time was nominally allocated for application
writing depending on the current frustration level (higher frustration implies
less time sacrificed to application and hence more time for writing papers).
The basic model behaviour is summarised in Table 6. Both paper and
citation counts diminish when less time is available for research. Frustration
and skill levels seem are insensitive to the amount of writing time. The break-
even point to lottery is around 60% (i.e. 30% of the total research resource or
15% of the total working time).
If the variability of skills between researchers is higher (explaining 65%
of the variance in papers’ quality) the outcome is bit less sinister. Then the
break-even is around 36% of the research time or 18% of the working time.
Writing intensity Citations Papers Frustration Skill
0% 416 88 32,3 113,3
10% 400 85 32,3 113,6
20% 387 82 32,6 113,6
30% 372 79 32,6 113,7
40% 356 75 32,7 113,5
50% 346 72 32,6 114,2
60% 329 69 32,8 113,5
70% 310 66 32,8 113,1
80% 300 63 33,0 113,4
90% 285 60 33,1 113,9
Table 6 Model performance as function of nominal application writing time
6 Discussion
We have studied how simple statistical simulation can reveal the implications
of different funding allocation mechanisms both to the system output (scientific
impact) as well as to the internal state of the system and individual researchers.
The results invite to more elaborate simulations and modelling of different
phenomena which in its turn will require new scientometric data in order to
achieve more quantitative predictions.
The very basic comparison of extreme scenarios (“communism”, “lottery”,
“idealism” and “capitalism”) revealed subtle interactions between research fund-
ing and career build up as well as the question of productivity as function of
resource allocation.
The two random allocation mechanisms produced similar average skill lev-
els for the total population. This was expected as the funding allocation did
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not consider skills in any way. However, although the promotion mechanism
had no direct dependency on obtained research funding or number of papers,
different resource allocation mechanisms resulted to quite distinct personnel
profiles. Hence, the promotion mechanisms can not be studied/used without
being aware of the funding mechanisms and vice versa.
For the purpose of simulating the application based grant allocation we
tacitly assumed that there exist two hidden qualities of a researcher. The one
called research skill contributes both to application quality and the actual
simulated scientific output whereas the other (writing skill) only affects the
success in grant allocation.
Taking the utilitarian view that the grant allocation aims to maximize
the scientific impact of the research community we can interprete both the
role of (application) writing skill and the actual evaluation error as defects
in the grant allocation. While these two mechanisms have similar effects to
the scientific impact (citations) they have different influences to the personnel
dynamics. Unpredictable evaluation errors have more adverse effect to the mo-
tivation of the researchers and hence to their paper output. Evaluation errors
also give more possibilities to mediocre young researchers to focus on research
and be promoted leading to more stagnated staff profile. More deterministic
selection mechanism leads to systematic funding and eventual promotion of
researchers having good combination of writing and research skills.
Qualitatively our model is credible - each selection process will introduce
some artificial criteria that are not directly linked to the intrinsinc scientific
potential of the applicant. A completely different question is how the research
skill and writing skill scale and compare together or with the evaluation error
and how the real selection mechanisms work (like first preselection of good
enough scientific content and then a "political" final round - or vice versa,
first formal consistency check and after that a peer review of the short list).
Despite of rather rudimentary model for frustration the interactions be-
tween funding decisions, motivation and productivity could be observed, in
particular in personnel profiles. The main observable, system throughput in
citations (as function of resource allocation), was, however, not very sensitive
to different frustration and promotion models.
Finally, the question that is of interest to the whole community of re-
searchers: what can we say about the balance between the time invested in
the application excercise and the accuracy in targeting the research funding.
The simulation results suggest that it will not pay off to try to reach high
accuracy in selection if it requires more investment to application writing and
evaluation. It is enough that scientific quality is in par with other qualities and
evaluation errors (given that all have similar statistical behavior). The loss of
research potential due to application overhead is quite obvious. What was more
surprising was the relative robustness of the system to tolerate significant bias
and errors in grant evaluation. This can partly be due to simulated yearly
allocation of research time that averages out random errors and partly due to
idealized promotion policy that takes into account only the scientific impact
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shown by citations and ignores local politics. Reality may be quite different in
this respect.
7 Conclusions
We implemented a conceptually simple simulation model that describes qual-
itatively the interactions between the grant allocation process, organisation’s
promotion process, researcher’s skill, motivation and productivity.
While the individual mechanisms were chosen quite simple and were ob-
served to behave in expected and understandable way the real value of simu-
lations comes from revealing the complexity of interactions between different
mechanisms.
Grant allocation mechanisms interact with promotion mechanism leading
to quite different personnel dynamics depending if the grant allocation is sys-
tematic but biased or if the allocation is unbiased but has significant inherent
randomness. Grant allocation affects also the frustration and motivation levels
in the population. Randomness in allocation is prone to give more possibilities
to less skilled staff and lowering the morale of the skilled staff whereas more
systematic allocation divides the population quite systematically to winners
and losers and leading to higher overall volatility in the staff due to faster
rotation of researchers with less favoured skill profile.
Different grant allocation mechanisms make the difference in the overall
performance mainly by enabling different researchers to work and publish to
be successfull in promotions. This causes both the head count and skill profiles
at different career levels to vary depending on the grant allocation schemes.
The source code of PEGS is available at www.bartneck.de/publications/
2016/PEGS/index.html.
7.1 Limitations and further research
The reported simulations are done for one closed scientific community (mim-
icking a national academic system as a whole). Hence they do not consider
competing organisations and mobility between them. Likewise, we consider
only individual researchers doing solitary work and no attempt is made to
model team work with joint publications or joint applications. Also there is
only one grant allocation mechanism with one set of rules and running yearly.
In reality there are always several mechanisms contributing to allocation
of research time ranging from the individual sacrifices of evenings and week-
ends via work arrangements at department level to actual grant instruments
available on institute and system level. In order to consider particular grant
allocation schemes the applied formal or implicit grading systems have to be
analyzed. There may be categories that can easily be identified with "writing
skills", for example. Also the funding bodies in question might have data on
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the distribution of evaluations given by different experts to the same applica-
tion (to get a measure for the evaluation error). Hence, it is at least plausible
that this part of the simulation model could be calibrated to a given system.
Before getting this kind of data it is difficult to derive quantitative esti-
mates for the tradeoff of investing more time to more elaborate applications to
reduce the evaluation error. This question is critical as the payoff from ideal
grant selection is always finite compared to random lottery type allocation
and the payoff is easily lost by evaluation errors and biases due to selection
technique.
The researchers are modeled quite simplistically - having only two constant
personal characteristics (research and writing skills). The rest of the properties
(like frustration dynamics, activity in applying, productivity, etc) are the same
for the whole population. These could easily be made to vary but this will lead
to need of identifying new distributions lacking empirical data. Also at present
the researcher is ignorant of her relative personal skill level as well as the
selection rules when allocating time to writing applications. If different funding
mechanisms and different organisations are introduced (with different rules
and HR policies) more elaborate model on researchers will be needed. This
would also give the possibility of trying to model the possible bias in selection
process towards certain personality types. Moreover, PEGS is currently not
able to model differences between scientific disciplines and countries.
For productivity and quality of publications there is empirical data that
has not yet been exploited fully in simulation. Without a model for the collab-
oration and joint publications there is no point in trying to fit the distribution
of the actual publication count. So we have aggregated researcher’s productiv-
ity in the research skill only. From the point of view of simulation results only
the cumulative citation count is important (be it obtained with few good or
several mediocre papers). The parameters like immediacity and longevity in
the model of Wang et al are likely to have an impact in the simulation results,
especially if we assume that these may vary as researcher’s personal properties
(like the skill/fitness).
The reported simulations were done under the assumption that ability to
focus to research for longer periods (within an academic year in our simula-
tion) did not boost productivity. This was crucial in comparing communistic
scenario to the others. How valid this assumption is, is a relevant question that
could perhaps be answered with access to time allocation data of researchers
that could be combined to the publication data.
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